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Abstract
This paper argues that three widely accepted motivating factors subsumed
under the broad heading of iconicity, namely iconicity of quantity, iconicity
of complexity and iconicity of cohesion, in fact have no role in explaining
grammatical asymmetries and should be discarded. The iconicity accounts
of the relevant phenomena have been proposed by authorities like Jakobson,
Haiman and Givo´n, but I argue that these linguists did not su‰ciently con-
sider alternative usage-based explanations in terms of frequency of use. A
closer look shows that the well-known Zipfian e¤ects of frequency of use
(leading to shortness and fusion) can be made responsible for all of the al-
leged iconicity e¤ects, and initial corpus data for a range of phenomena
confirm the correctness of the approach.
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1. Introduction
The notion of iconicity has become very popular in the last 25 years
among functional and cognitive linguists. In Croft’s (2003: 102) words,
‘‘the intuition behind iconicity is that the structure of language reflects in
some way the structure of experience’’. Iconicity is thus a very broad no-
tion, and it has been understood and applied in a great variety of ways
(see Newmeyer 1992: §§2–3 for an attempt at a survey). In this paper,
I will examine just the three sub-types of (diagrammatic)1 iconicity in
(1)–(3), which have played an important role in discussions of gram-
matical asymmetries. I will argue that in fact none of these is relevant
for explaining grammatical asymmetries, and that the phenomena in
question should instead be explained by asymmetries of frequency of
occurrence.
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(1) Iconicity of quantity
‘‘Greater quantities in meaning are expressed by greater quantities
of form.’’
Example: In Latin adjective inflection, the comparative and super-
lative denote increasingly higher degrees and are coded by increas-
ingly longer su‰xes (e.g., long(-us) ‘long’, long-ior ‘longer’, long-
issim(-us) ‘longest’).
(2) Iconicity of complexity
‘‘More complex meanings are expressed by more complex forms.’’
Example: Causatives are more complex semantically than the corre-
sponding non-causatives, so they are coded by more complex forms,
e.g., Turkish du¨s¸(-mek) ‘fall’, causative du¨s¸-u¨r(-mek) ‘make fall,
drop’.
(3) Iconicity of cohesion
‘‘Meanings that belong together more closely semantically are ex-
pressed by more cohesive forms.’’
Example: In possessive noun phrases with body-part terms, the
possessum and the possessor are conceptually inseparable. This is
mirrored in greater cohesion of coding in many languages, e.g., Mal-
tese id ‘hand’, id-i ‘my hand’, contrasting with sig˙g˙u ‘chair’, is-sig˙g˙u
tiegh-i [the-chair of-me] ‘my chair’ (*sig˙g˙(u)-i).
While iconicity of quantity is mentioned rarely, iconicity of complexity
and iconicity of cohesion are often invoked in the functional and cogni-
tive literature (and recently to some extent also in the generative litera-
ture; see §4.5). Both have been applied to a wide range of grammatical
phenomena by many di¤erent authors.
I argue in this paper that these three types of iconicity play no role
in explaining grammatical asymmetries of the type long(-us)/long-ior,
du¨s¸(-mek)/du¨s¸-u¨r(-mek), id-i/sig˙g˙u tiegh-i. Instead, such formal asym-
metries can and should be explained by frequency asymmetries: In all
these cases, the shorter and more cohesive expression types occur signifi-
cantly more frequently than the longer and less cohesive expression types,
and this su‰ces to explain their formal properties. No appeal to iconicity
is necessary. Worse, iconicity often makes wrong predictions, whereas fre-
quency consistently makes the correct predictions.
I want to emphasize that I make no claims about other types of iconic-
ity, such as
– iconicity of paradigmatic isomorphism (one form, one meaning in the
system, i.e., synonymy and homonymy are avoided; Haiman 1980; Croft
1990a: 165, 2003: 105);
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– iconicity of syntagmatic isomorphism (one form, one meaning in the
string, i.e., empty, zero and portmanteau morphs are avoided; Croft
1990a: 165, 2003: 103);2
– iconicity of sequence (sequence of forms matches sequence of experi-
ences; e.g., Greenberg 1963 [1966: 103]);
– iconicity of contiguity (forms that belong together semantically occur
next to each other; this is similar to iconicity of cohesion, but di¤erent in
crucial ways, cf. §5);
– iconicity of repetition (repeated forms signal repetition in experience,
as when reduplication expresses plurality or distribution).
For most of these iconicity types, frequency is clearly not a relevant
factor, and I have no reason to doubt the conventional view that the
relevant phenomena are motivated by functional factors that can be con-
veniently subsumed under the label iconicity. Whether these functional
factors can be reduced to a general preference for iconic over noniconic
patterns is a separate question that I will not pursue here.
I also need to emphasize that I am interested in explanation of gram-
matical structures, perhaps more so than many other authors that have
discussed iconicity. That is, I want to know why language structure is
the way it is, whereas some authors seem to be content with observing
that language structure is sometimes iconic:
The traditional view of language is that most relationships between linguistic units
and the corresponding meanings are arbitrary . . . But the cognitive claim is that
the degree of iconicity in language is much higher than has traditionally been
thought to be the case. (Lee 2001: 77)
As long as one merely observes that cases like long(-us)/long-ior and
du¨s¸(-mek)/du¨s¸-u¨r(-mek) can be regarded as iconic in some way, I have
no problem. What I am denying is that iconicity plays a motivating role
and should be invoked in explaining why the patterns are the way they are.
What I observed while reading the literature on iconicity is that a num-
ber of authors (e.g., Hockett 1958: 577–578; Givo´n 1985, 1991) seem to
use the term ‘‘iconicity’’ as a kind of antonym of ‘‘arbitrariness’’, so that
almost anything about language structure that is not arbitrary falls under
iconicity. I am in broad sympathy with Givo´n’s general account of the
relation between arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness in language, but I
would insist on the need to identify the relevant factors as precisely as
possible and to make testable predictions. It is quite possible that the dis-
agreements about the role of frequency vs. iconicity will eventually turn
out to be less severe than it may seem at the beginning, but in any event
this paper should help to clarify the issues.
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Iconicity and the frequency asymmetries discussed here are universal
explanatory factors, so their e¤ects should be universal. This means that
in principle confirming data could come from any language, and ideally
the data should come from a large representative sample of languages.
Such data are still not very widely available, so this paper will continue
the practice of Haiman (1983) (and much other work) of making claims
about universal asymmetries that are not fully backed up by confirming
data, but that nevertheless seem very plausible because of the apparent
absence of counterevidence. Likewise, disconfirming data could come
from any language, but of course isolated counterexamples are not su‰-
cient to show that no systematic coding asymmetry exists. Many of the
generalizations cited here are known to be merely strong tendencies, not
absolute universals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: §2 discusses icon-
icity of quantity, §§3–4 discuss iconicity of complexity, and §§5–6 discuss
iconicity of cohesion. For each subtype of iconicity, I will first cite au-
thors who have advocated it and mention examples of phenomena that
are allegedly motivated by iconicity, before presenting my arguments for
a frequency-based explanation of the phenomena. The final §7 presents
the conclusions.
2. Iconicity of quantity
2.1. Advocates and examples
Iconicity of quantity was defined in §1 as follows:
(4) Greater quantities in meaning are expressed by greater quantities of
form.
It seems that the first author to mention this motivating principle was
Jakobson (1965[1971: 352]) and (1971). Jakobson cited three examples:
(i) In many languages, ‘‘the positive, comparative and superlative de-
grees of adjectives show a gradual increase in the number of phonemes,
e.g., high-higher-highest, [Latin] altus, altior, altissimus. In this way, the
signantia reflect the gradation gamut of the signata’’ (1965[1971: 352]).
The higher the degree, the longer the adjective.
(ii) ‘‘The signans of the plural tends to echo the meaning of a numeral
increment by an increased length of the form’’ (1965[1971: 352]). The
more referents, the more phonemes (e.g., singular book, plural books,
French singular je finis ‘I finish’, plural nous finissons ‘we finish’).
(iii) In Russian, the perfective aspect expresses ‘‘a limitation in the
extent of the narrated event’’, and it is expressed by a more limited (i.e.,
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a smaller) number of phonemes (e.g., perfective zamoroz-it, imperfective
zamorazˇ-ivat ‘freeze’) (Jakobson 1971).
Iconicity of quantity is mentioned approvingly in Plank (1979: 123),
Haiman (1980: 528–529, 1985: 5), Anttila (1989: 17), in Taylor’s (2002:
46) Cognitive Grammar textbook, and in Itkonen (2004: 28); see also
Lako¤ and Johnson (1980: 127).
2.2. Frequency-based explanation
Any e‰cient sign system in which costs correlate with signal length will
follow the following economy principle:3
(5) The more predictable a sign is, the shorter it is.
Since frequency implies predictability, we also get the following predic-
tion for e‰cient sign systems:
(6) The more frequent a sign is, the shorter it is.
These principles have been well known at least since Horn’s (1921) and
Zipf ’s (1935) work, but somehow under the influence of the structuralist
movements many linguists lost sight of them for a few decades. However,
more recently cognitively oriented linguists have begun to appreciate the
importance of frequency again (e.g., Bybee and Hopper 2001, among
many others). I do not claim to have original insights about the way in
which frequency influences grammatical structures, but I want to argue
that iconicity turns out to be less important as an explanatory concept if
one gives frequency the explanatory role that it deserves.
Principle (6) straightforwardly explains Jakobson’s observations about
adjectival degree marking and singular/plural asymmetries, because uni-
versally comparative and superlative forms are significantly rarer than
positive forms of adjectives, and plural forms are significantly rarer than
singular forms (see Greenberg 1966: 34–37, 40–41). It is not possible to
make such a universal statement about perfective and imperfective aspect,
and the frequency of these aspectual categories depends much more on
the lexical meaning of the individual verb. But for Russian, Fenk-Oczlon
(1990) has shown that there is a strong correlation between length and
frequency of a verb form: in general, the more frequent member of a Rus-
sian aspectual pair is also shorter.
This frequency-based explanation is not only su‰cient to account
for the phenomena cited by Jakobson, but also necessary, because the
principle of iconicity of quantity makes many wrong predictions (as
was also observed by Haiman 2000: 287). For example, it predicts that
plurals should generally be longer than duals, that augmentatives should
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generally be longer than diminutives, that words for ‘ten’ should be
longer than words for ‘seven’, or even that words for ‘long’ should
be longer than words for ‘short’, or that words for ‘elephant’ should be
longer than words for ‘mouse’. None of these predictions are generally
correct (except perhaps for the last prediction, but note that mouse is
about twice as frequent as elephant in English).4
Iconicity of quantity has never been considered particularly important,
and its refutation here is only a prelude to the refutation of the other two
kinds of iconicity in §§3–6.
3. Iconicity of complexity: Advocates and examples
Iconicity of complexity was defined in §1 as follows:
(7) More complex meanings are expressed by more complex forms.
Here are some quotations from the literature that describe this principle
and refer to it as ‘‘isomorphic’’ or ‘‘iconic’’.
– Lehmann (1974: 111): ‘‘Je komplexer die semantische Repra¨sentation
eines Zeichens, desto komplexer seine phonologische Repra¨senta-
tion.’’ (‘The more complex the semantic representation of a sign is,
the more complex is its phonological representation.’)
– Mayerthaler (1981: 25): ‘‘Was semantisch ‘‘mehr’’ ist, sollte auch kon-
struktionell ‘‘mehr’’ sein.’’ (‘What is ‘‘more’’ semantically should also
be ‘‘more’’ constructionally.’)
– Givo´n (1991: §2.2): ‘‘A larger chunk of information will be given a
larger chunk of code.’’
– Haiman (2000: 283): ‘‘The more abstract the concept, the more re-
duced its morphological expression will tend to be. Morphological
bulk corresponds directly and iconically to conceptual intension.’’
– Langacker (2000: 77): ‘‘[I]t is worth noting an iconicity between of ’s
phonological value and the meaning ascribed to it (cf. Haiman 1983).
Of all the English prepositions, of is phonologically the weakest by
any reasonable criterion. . . . Now as one facet of its iconicity, of is
arguably the most tenuous of the English prepositions from the se-
mantic standpoint as well . . .’’
In Lehmann’s (1974) approach, semantic complexity is measured by
counting the number of features needed to describe the meaning of an ex-
pression. A contrast between presence and absence of a semantic feature
is often called ‘‘semantic markedness’’, and very often iconicity of com-
plexity is described as a kind of ‘‘iconicity of markedness matching’’:
(8) Marked meanings are expressed by marked forms.
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This principle was already formulated by Jakobson (1963[1966: 270]),
and repeated many times in the later literature, e.g.,
– Plank (1979: 139): ‘‘Die formale Markiertheitsopposition bildet die
konzeptuell-semantische Markiertheitsopposition d[iagrammatisch]-
ikonisch ab.’’ (‘The formal markedness opposition mirrors the
conceptual-semantic markedness opposition in a diagrammatically
iconic way.’)
– Haiman (1980: 528): ‘‘Categories that are marked morphologically
and syntactically are also marked semantically.’’
– Mayerthaler (1987: 48–9): ‘‘If (and only if ) a semantically more
marked category Cj is encoded as more featured [¼ formally complex]
than a less marked category Ci, the encoding of Cj is said to be
iconic.’’
– Givo´n (1991: 106, 1995: 58): ‘‘The meta-iconic markedness principle:
Categories that are cognitively marked—i.e., complex—tend also to
be structurally marked.’’
– Aissen (2003: 449): ‘‘Iconicity favors the morphological marking of
syntactically marked configurations.’’
For similar statements, see also Zwicky (1978: 137), Matthews (1991:
236), Newmeyer (1992: 763), and Levinson (2000: 136–137).
By ‘‘formally marked’’, these authors generally mean ‘‘expressed
overtly’’. Typical examples of such markedness matching are given in
(9).
(9) less marked/unmarked (more) marked
number singular (tree-Ø) plural (tree-s)
case subject (Latin homo-Ø) object (homin-em)
tense present ( play-Ø) past ( play-ed )
person third (Spanish canta-Ø)5 second (canta-s)
gender masculine ( petit-Ø) feminine ( petit-e)
causation non-causative
(Turkish du¨s¸-Ø-mek ‘fall’)
causative
(du¨s¸-u¨r-mek ‘fell, drop’)
object inanimate animate
(Spanish Veo la casa Veo a la nin˜a.
‘I see the house’ ‘I see the girl.’)
That there are universal formal asymmetries in these (and many other)
categories has been known since Greenberg (1966), and Jakobson
(1963[1966]) and (1965[1971]) explicitly refers to Greenberg’s cross-
linguistic work. However, Greenberg did not invoke iconicity to explain
the formal asymmetries of the kind illustrated in (9). He had good rea-
sons, as we will see in the next section.
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4. Iconicity of complexity: frequency-based explanation
4.1. Complex/‘‘marked’’ expressions are rarer
Greenberg’s (1966) explanation was in terms of the frequency asymme-
tries in the use of the grammatical forms. He noted that ‘‘less marked’’
forms are more frequent, and ‘‘more marked’’ forms are less frequent
across languages. Thus, the economy principles in (5)–(6) are su‰cient
to explain the asymmetries in (9) (see also Croft 2003: 110–117). The
English preposition of is not only the most ‘‘semantically tenuous’’
(Langacker 2000: 77), but also the most frequent of all the English prep-
ositions. Singulars are more frequent than plurals, nominatives are more
frequent than accusatives, the present tense is more frequent than the
past tense, the third person is more frequent than other persons, and
the masculine is more frequent than the feminine. All of this was docu-
mented by Greenberg (1966) for a few selected languages, and the hy-
pothesis that it holds universally has not been challenged. That causa-
tives are generally less frequent than the corresponding non-causatives
is also clear; I discuss this case in more detail below (§4.4). And among
objects, inanimate referents are much more frequent than animate refer-
ents (§4.5).
This frequency-based explanation is not only su‰cient to account for
the relevant phenomena, but also necessary, because iconicity of com-
plexity makes some wrong predictions. In (10), I list cases that go in the
opposite direction of the patterns in (9).
(10) less marked/unmarked (more) marked
number plural singular
Welsh plu ‘feathers’ plu-en ‘feather’
case object case subject case
Godoberi mak 0i ‘child’ mak 0i-di (ergative)
person second p. imperative third p. imperative
Latin canta-Ø ‘sing!’ canta-to ‘let her sing’
gender female male
English widow-Ø widow-er
causation causative noncausative
German o¨¤nen sich o¨¤nen
In all these cases, frequency makes the right predictions. Plurals like
Welsh plu ‘feathers’ are more frequent than singulars (Tiersma 1982), in
the imperative mood the second person is more frequent than the third
person, the word widow is more frequent than the word widower, and
with verbs like ‘open’, the causative is more frequent than the noncausa-
tive (see §4.4).
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These exceptions have long been known in the literature, but linguists
have often described them in terms of markedness reversal. The idea is
that markedness values can be di¤erent in di¤erent contexts, so that, for
example, third person is not absolutely unmarked with respect to second
person, but in certain contexts second person can be unmarked and first
person can be marked (e.g., Waugh 1982; Tiersma 1982; Witkowski and
Brown 1983; Haiman 1985: 148–149; Croft 1990a: 66). But in order to
reconcile the cases in (10) with iconicity of complexity, one would have
to show that not only the formal coding, but also the semantic/functional
markedness value has changed. This is much more di‰cult, and it has
not been shown that it is generally true that in cases of markedness rever-
sal, the formally unmarked term of the opposition is also semantically or
functionally unmarked. For example, Tiersma’s (1982) main additional
evidence that ‘‘locally unmarked plurals’’ like Welsh plu ‘feathers’ are
generally unmarked (i.e., do not merely show reversed formal coding) is
that in analogical leveling, the plural survives. But analogical leveling is
of course just another symptom of frequency of occurrence (cf. Bybee
1985: Ch. 3).
To make matters even more complex, some authors seem to mean fre-
quency when they say (functional) unmarkedness: Marked means ‘rare’,
and unmarked means ‘frequent’. For example, in a discussion of un-
marked plurals, Haiman writes:
. . . what is fundamentally at issue is markedness. Where plurality is the norm, it
is the plural which is unmarked, and a derived marked singulative is employed
to signal oneness: thus, essentially, wheat vs. grain of wheat. (Haiman 2000:
287)
The ‘‘norm’’ is of course the same as the more frequent situation, so what
is fundamentally at issue is frequency. Linguists are of course free to
define their terms in whatever way they wish, but claiming not only that
formally marked elements tend to be ‘‘functionally marked’’ (in the sense
of being less frequent), but also that this a surprising instance of ‘‘mark-
edness matching’’ (or iconicity), is not helpful. The much simpler obser-
vation is that formally marked elements tend to be less frequent, and
this observation is straightforwardly explained by the economy princi-
ples in (5)–(6). Neither ‘‘iconicity’’ nor ‘‘markedness’’ are relevant con-
cepts in stating and explaining these facts (see Haspelmath 2006 for
detailed argumentation that a notion of markedness is superfluous in
linguistics).
The contrasts in (9) show zero expression vs. overt expression, but
some authors such as Lehmann (1974) and Haiman (2000) also talk
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about length di¤erences between di¤erent types of morphemes. In partic-
ular, both authors note that grammatical morphemes are universally
shorter than lexical morphemes, and they claim that this iconically mir-
rors their more abstract or less complex meaning. But again frequency
and economy account for the same facts. Iconicity makes the wrong
prediction that lexical items with highly abstract or simple meanings
should be consistently shorter than items with more concrete or complex
meanings (as noted by Ronneberger-Sibold 1980: 239). It predicts, for ex-
ample, that entity should be shorter than thing or action, that animal
should be shorter than cat, that perceive should be shorter than see, and
so on.6
4.2. Relative frequency and absolute frequency
It is important to recognize that the relevant type of frequency for the
purposes of this paper is relative frequency, not absolute frequency (cf.
Corbett et al. 2001 for some discussion of this contrast). That is, what I
am looking at here is the relation between the frequency of one category
and the frequency of another category (within a class of lexemes or a
construction): e.g., the relation between the frequency of singulars and
the frequency of plurals (in nouns), the relation between the frequency of
positive forms and the frequency of comparative forms (in adjectives), the
relation between the frequency of inanimate objects and the frequency of
inanimate objects (in transitive verb phrases), and so on.
I am not looking at the absolute frequencies of individual lexemes with
a particular category. The absolute frequency of English books, the plural
of book, is 131 (occurrences per million words, Leech et al. 2001), while
the singular of notebook occurs only 8 times. But the singular and the
plural should not be compared across di¤erent lexemes. The relative fre-
quencies are as expected: book 243, books 131, notebook 8, notebooks 3.
Likewise for positives and comparatives: the comparative lower occurs
111 times, and the positive bright occurs only 54 times. But the propor-
tions (i.e., relative frequencies) are as expected: low 158, lower 111, bright
54, brighter 5.
What is crucial is that the items whose frequency and formal expression
is compared are paradigmatic alternatives, i.e., that in some sense they
must occur in the same slot. It is in such slots that expectations arise, so
that more frequent items can make do with shorter coding because of
their greater predictability. If two items are not paradigmatically related,
it does not make so much sense to compare their frequency.
Another question is how big the frequency di¤erence should be to be
reflected in grammar. The answer is: significant. Perhaps one would see
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bigger di¤erences in form where the frequency di¤erences are bigger, but
this is an issue that I do not pursue in this paper.
4.3. Adjectives and abstract nouns: Resolving an iconicity paradox
Croft and Cruse (2004: 175) observe ‘‘a curious iconicity paradox’’ in
connection with adjectives such as those in (11) and the corresponding
abstract nouns:
(11) long leng-th
deep dep-th
high heigh-t
thick thick-ness
They note that definitions of such adjectives presuppose a scale of length,
depth, height, or thickness that is expressed by an abstract noun. Thus,
long means something like ‘noteworthy in terms of length’ (cf. also
Mel’cˇuk 1967). This abstract noun is thus conceptually simpler than the
adjective, and yet it tends to be morphologically more complex across
languages. The situation in (11) thus ‘‘appears to run counter to the prin-
ciple that morphological complexity mirrors cognitive complexity’’ (Croft
and Cruse 2004: 175).
Croft and Cruse try to solve the paradox, but do not seem to be very
confident in their solution:
One possible explanation is that, in applying the iconic principle, we should
distinguish between structural complexity (in terms of the number of elementary
components and their interconnections) and processing complexity (in terms of
the cognitive e¤ort involved). Perhaps they are acquired first of all in an unanal-
yzed, primitive, ‘Gestalt’ sense, which is basically relative. Maybe in order to
develop the full adult system, analysis and restructuring are necessary. Some of
the results of the analysis may well be conceptually simpler in some sense than
the analysand, but the extra e¤ort that has gone into them is mirrored by the mor-
phological complexity. (Croft and Cruse 2004: 175)
But in fact, no solution to the paradox is required, because it is a
pseudo-paradox: There is no ‘‘principle that morphological complexity
mirrors cognitive complexity’’. As we saw, morphological complexity
(in the sense of length) mirrors rarity of use. It is easy to determine that
adjectives are significantly more frequent than the corresponding abstract
nouns. In (12), frequency figures from Leech et al. 2001 are given (the
figures again indicate occurrences per million words). The example of
beautiful/beauty shows that isolated exceptions to the coding regularity
are possible.7
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(12) long 392 leng-th 85
deep 97 dep-th 41
high 547 heigh-t 47
thick 51 thick-ness <10
beautiful 87 beauty 44
4.4. The inchoative-causative alternation: Economy instead of iconicity
In §3 and §4.1, we saw that pairs of noncausative (inchoative) and caus-
ative verbs are not uniformly coded: Sometimes the causative is coded
overtly, based on the inchoative (e.g., Turkish du¨s¸-Ø-mek ‘fall’, du¨s¸-u¨r-
mek ‘fell, drop’), and sometimes the inchoative is coded overtly, based
on the semantically causative verb. Such cases are called anticausatives
(e.g., German o¨¤nen ‘open (tr.)’, sich o¨¤nen ‘open (intr.)’; Russian otkry-
vat 0-sja ‘open (tr.)’, otkryvat 0-sja ‘open (intr.)’).
On the natural assumption that causatives have an additional meaning
element (i.e. Russian otkryvat 0sja means ‘become open’, and otkryvat 0
means ‘cause to become open’), anticausative coding would be counter-
iconic (as was observed by Mel’cˇuk 1967). This was seen as a problem
by Haspelmath (1993), who assumed the iconicity-of-complexity principle
(as well as markedness matching). However, Haspelmath found in a
cross-linguistic study that di¤erent verb pairs tend to behave di¤erently
with respect to which member of the pair (the inchoative or the causative)
tends to be coded overtly (cf. also Croft 1990b). Some verb meanings
(which for convenience will be called automatic) tend to be coded as caus-
atives (e.g., ‘freeze’, ‘dry’, ‘sink’, ‘go out’, ‘melt’), whereas others (which
for convenience will be called costly) are preferably coded as anticaus-
atives (e.g., ‘split’, ‘break’, ‘close’, ‘open’, ‘gather’). The idea behind the
terms automatic and costly is that the automatic events do not often
require input from an agent to occur, whereas the costly events tend not
to occur spontaneously but must be instigated by an agent. While the au-
tomatic events conform to iconicity, it is especially the costly events that
do not. Haspelmath tried to save the iconicity hypothesis by suggesting
that in some way the frequency of occurrence of a particular event de-
scription is reflected in the way its meaning is treated by speakers:
Iconicity in language is based [not on objective meaning but] on conceptual
meaning . . . Events that are more likely to occur spontaneously will be associated
with a conceptual stereotype (or prototype) of a spontaneous event, and this will
be expressed in a structurally unmarked way. (Haspelmath 1993: 106–107)
This move is reminiscent of Lehmann’s suggestion that rarity results in
a high informational value and therefore somehow in high semantic
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complexity (cf. note 6), and of the desperate attempt by Croft and Cruse
to solve their iconicity paradox.
Fortunately, a much simpler explanation is available in which iconicity
of complexity plays no role, and the coding preferences are explained
in terms of economy: Automatic verb meanings tend to occur more fre-
quently as inchoatives than costly verb meanings, which tend to occur
more frequently as causatives. Due to economic motivation, the rarer ele-
ments tend to be overtly coded. Wright (2001: 127–128) presents some
preliminary corpus evidence from English, as shown in Table 1:
Thus, inchoatives and causatives behave in much the same way as singu-
lars and plurals: Whichever member of the pair occurs more frequently
tends to be zero-coded, while the rarer (and hence less expected) member
tends to be overtly coded. Language-particular di¤erences often obscure
this picture (e.g., languages that never have overtly coded singulars, or
languages lacking overtly coded causatives), which emerges fully only
once a typological perspective is adopted.
4.5. Di¤erential object marking: Economy instead of iconicity
It has long been observed (e.g., Blansitt 1973; Comrie 1989; Bossong
1985, 1998) that the overt coding of a direct object often depends on
its animacy, and that such variation in object-marking can be subsumed
under a general rule:
(13) The higher a (direct) object is on the animacy scale, the more likely
it is to be overtly coded (i.e., accusative-marked).
According to Comrie, this is because animate objects are not as ‘‘natural’’
as inanimate objects:
. . . the most natural kind of transitive construction is one where the A[gent] is
high in animacy and definiteness and the P[atient] is lower in animacy and
Table 1. Percentage of transitive (¼ causative) occurrences of some English inchoative-
causative verb pairs
verb pair % transitive
freeze 62% more causatives
dry 61%
melt 72%
burn 76%
open 80%
break 90%
A
B
more anticausatives
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definiteness; and any deviation from this pattern leads to a more marked construc-
tion. (Comrie 1989: 128)
In an interesting paper that tries to integrate insights from the
functional-typological literature into an Optimality Theory (OT) frame-
work, Aissen (2003: §3) proposes an account that appeals to a fixed
constraint subhierarchy involving local conjunction of a markedness hier-
archy of relation/animacy constraints (cf. 14) with a constraint against
non-coding (*ØCase):
(14) markedness subhierarchy:
*Obj/Humg *Obj/Animg *Obj/Inan
The resulting fixed constraint subhierarchy is shown in (15). Roughly this
can be read as follows: Structures with zero-coded human objects are
worse than structures with zero-coded animate objects, and these in turn
are worse than structures with zero-coded inanimate objects.
(15) *Obj/Hum & *ØCaseg *Obj/Anim & *ØCaseg *Obj/Inan &
*ØCase
Aissen motivates these constraints by appealing to markedness matching
and iconicity:
The e¤ect of local conjunction here is to link markedness of content (expressed by
the markedness subhierarchy) to markedness of expression (expressed by *Ø).
That content and expression are linked in this way is a fundamental idea of mark-
edness theory (Jakobson 1939; Greenberg 1966). In the domain of Di¤erential
Object Marking, this is expressed formally through the constraints [in (15)]. Thus
they are iconicity constraints: they favor morphological marks for marked
configurations. (Aissen 2003: 449)
Combined with economy constraints (*Struc), these constraints allow
Aissen to describe all and only the attested language types in her
framework.
However, a much more straightforward explanation of the Di¤erential
Object Marking universal is available: Inanimate NPs occur more fre-
quently as objects, whereas animate NPs occur more frequently as sub-
jects. Due to economic motivation, the rarer elements tend to be overtly
coded. This explanation has in fact long been known (Filimonova 2005
cites antecedents in the 19th century), though actual frequency evidence
has been cited only more recently (see Ja¨ger 2004).8
Thus, no appeal to markedness matching or iconicity is needed, nor is
Aissen’s elaborate machinery of OT constraints needed to explain Di¤er-
ential Object Marking.
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5. Iconicity of cohesion: Advocates and examples
Iconicity of cohesion was defined in §1 as follows:
(16) Meanings that belong together more closely are expressed by more
cohesive forms.
Iconicity of cohesion is discussed in detail by Haiman (1983) under the
label ‘‘iconic expression of conceptual distance’’ (‘‘The linguistic distance
between expressions corresponds to the conceptual distance between
them’’, Haiman 1983: 782).9 What he means by linguistic distance is
made clear by the scale in (17), where (a)–(d) show diminishing linguistic
distance (in my terms, increasing cohesion).
(17) Haiman’s (1983: 782) cohesion scale
a. X word Y (function-word expression)
b. X Y ( juxtaposition)
c. X–Y (bound expression)
d. Z (portmanteau expression)
I prefer the term cohesion to distance for this scale, because (b) and (c) do
not literally di¤er in distance, and distance is not really applicable to (d).
Moreover, I want to distinguish strictly between cohesion and contigu-
ity. That there is a functionally motivated preference for contiguity, i.e.,
for elements that belong together semantically to occur next to each
other in speech, is beyond question (see also Hawkins 2004: Ch. 5).
Newmeyer’s (1992: 761–762) discussion of ‘‘iconicity of distance’’ (and
similarly Givo´n’s (1985: 202, 1991: 89) ‘‘proximity principle’’) conflate
cohesion and contiguity. I only argue against an iconicity-based explana-
tion of phenomena related to cohesion.
The following four examples of iconicity of cohesion are the most im-
portant cases cited in the literature:
(i) Possessive constructions: Inalienable possession shows at least the
same degree of cohesion as alienable possession, because in inalienable
possession (i.e., possession of kinship and body part terms) the possessor
and the possessum belong together more closely semantically (Haiman
1983: 793–795, 1985: 130–136; see also Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1996). An
example:
(18) Abun (West Papuan; Berry and Berry 1999: 77–82)
a. ji bi nggwe
I of garden
‘my garden’
b. ji syim
I arm
‘my arm’
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(ii) Causative constructions: Causative constructions showing a greater
degree of cohesion tend to express direct causation (where cause and
result belong together more closely), whereas causative constructions
showing less cohesion tend to express indirect causation (Haiman 1983:
783–787; cf. also Comrie 1989: 172–173; Dixon 2000: 74–78). The fol-
lowing example is cited by Dixon (2000: 69):
(19) Buru (Austronesian; Indonesia; Grimes 1991: 211)
a. Da puna ringe gosa.
3sg.A cause 3sg.O be.good
‘He (did something which, indirectly,) made her well.’
b. Da pe-gosa ringe.
3sg.A caus-be.good 3sg.O
‘He healed her (directly, with spiritual power).’
A similar Japanese example is provided by Horie (1993: 26):
(20) a. John-wa Mary-ni huku-o ki-se-ta.
John-top Mary-dat clothes-acc wear-caus-past
‘John put clothes on Mary.’
b. John-wa Mary-ni huku-o ki sase-ta.
John-top Mary-dat clothes-acc wear cause-past
‘John made Mary wear clothes.’
The much-discussed English distinction between kill and cause to die is of
course also an instance of this contrast (e.g., Lako¤ and Johnson 1980:
131).
(iii) Coordinating constructions: Many languages distinguish between
loose coordination and tight coordination (i.e., less vs. more cohesive pat-
terns), where the first expresses greater conceptual distance and the latter
expresses less conceptual distance (Haiman 1983: 788–790, 1985: 111–
124). Haiman discusses coordination of clauses and cites the two exam-
ples in (21) and (22), where the greater cohesion is manifested by the
absence of a coordinator. In (21a), the greater conceptual distance lies in
the temporal non-connectedness, while in (22a), the greater conceptual
distance lies in the lack of subject identity.
(21) Fe’fe’ (Bantoid; Cameroon; Hyman 1971: 43)
a. a` ka` ge´n nte¯e nı¯ njwe¯n lwa` 0
he past go market and buy yams
‘He went to the market and also (at some later date) bought
yams.’
b. a` ka` ge´n nte¯e njwe¯n lwa` 0
he past go market buy yams
‘He went to the market and bought yams (there).’
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(22) Aghem (Bantoid; Cameroon; Anderson 1979: 114)
a. O` na´m kb gha´ yı´a z
she cook fufu we.excl and eat
‘She cooked fufu and we ate it.’
b. O` m z
˙
m ma´m kb
she past sing cook fufu
‘She sang and cooked fufu.’
Wa¨lchli (2005: Ch. 3) also discusses noun phrase coordination and cites
contrasts such as (23). He calls the semantic distinction between them
‘‘accidental coordination’’ vs. ‘‘natural coordination’’, and claims that
the formal contrast between loose coordination in (23a) and tight coordi-
nation in (23b) iconically reflects this semantic contrast (2005: 13).
(23) Georgian
a. gveli da k 0ac 0i
snake and man
‘the snake and the man’
b. da-dzma
sister-brother
‘brother and sister’
(iv) Complement clause constructions: Haiman (1985: 124–130) also
discusses complement-clause constructions in terms of iconicity of cohe-
sion mirroring conceptual closeness. He observes that in the contrast in
(24), the ‘‘reduced or contracted version signals conceptual closeness
(same subject), while a non-reduced version signals conceptual distance
(di¤erent subject)’’ (1985: 126).
(24) a. Who do you wanna succeed? (who¼patient; same subject)
b. Who do you want to succeed? (who¼agent possible; di¤.
subject possible)
But much better known is Givo´n’s work on iconic form-function cor-
respondences in complement clauses (1980, 1990: Ch. 13, 2001: Ch. 12;
see also 1985: 199–202, 1991: 95–96), which posits a scale of ‘‘event
integration’’ (called ‘‘binding hierarchy’’ in earlier versions) that corre-
sponds to a scale of formal integration. In the most recent version of
this, Givo´n posits an iconic principle of ‘‘event integration and clause
union’’:
The stronger is the semantic bond between the two events, the more extensive will
be the syntactic integration of the two clauses into a single though complex clause
(Givo´n 2001: 40)
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Among his examples are contrasts such as the following, where in each
case the first example exhibits greater event integration and greater syn-
tactic integration (non-finiteness and/or absence of a complementizer):
(25) a. John made Mary quit her job. (2001: 45)
b. John caused Mary to quit her job.
(26) a. She wanted him to leave. (2001: 47)
b. She wished that he would leave.
(27) a. She told him to leave. (2001: 48)
b. She insisted that he must leave.
(28) a. She saw him coming out of the theatre. (2001: 50)
b. She saw that he came out of the theatre.
6. Iconicity of cohesion: frequency-based explanation
My claim here is that Haiman’s cohesion scale in (17) does not reflect one
single underlying cause. It should be taken apart into three di¤erent
distinctions: (i) overt coding vs. lack of coding (X word Y vs. X Y), (ii)
juxtaposition vs. bound expression (X Y vs. X-Y), and (iii) portmanteau
expression (Z). All three are related to frequency, but not in the same
way. This is clearest in the case of portmanteau expression (or supple-
tion), which only occurs when the combination of the two elements has a
high absolute frequency. For instance, in the domain of causative con-
structions, English has the bound causatives sadd-en ‘make sad’, wid-en
‘make wide’, hard-en ‘make hard’, but it is only for high-frequency adjec-
tives like good and small that it has suppletive causatives (improve ‘make
good’, reduce ‘make small’). Similarly, a few cases of suppletion in posses-
sive constructions are attested, but these all come from high-frequency
nouns such as ‘mother’ (e.g., Ju|’hoan taqe` ‘mother’, a´ı´a´ ‘my mother’,
Dickens 2005: 35). The reason why high absolute frequency favours
suppletion (and irregularity more generally) has long been known: High
frequency elements are easy to store and retrieve from memory, so
there is little need for regularity (cf. Ostho¤ 1899, Ronneberger-Sibold
1988).
However, the overt-covert contrast (X word Y vs. X Y) and the free-
bound contrast (X Y vs. X-Y) are due to frequency-induced predictabil-
ity, as seen earlier for contrasts that others have explained by iconicity of
quantity (§2) and by iconicity of complexity (§3–4). Predictability leads to
shortness of coding by economy, and shortness of coding itself leads
to bound expression, because short (and unstressed) elements do not
have enough bulk to stand on their own. The phenomena that Haiman
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explains through iconicity of cohesion actually all instantiate only the
overt-covert contrast and/or the free-bound contrast, so what matters
for them is again relative frequency.
Let us now examine the four main construction types with alleged ef-
fects of iconicity of cohesion to see how their properties can be explained
in terms of relative frequency.
6.1. Possessive constructions
With inalienably possessed nouns, possessive constructions are of course
much more frequent than with alienably possessed nouns (cf. Nichols
1988: 579). This can be easily demonstrated with corpus figures. Table 2
shows frequencies of three (hopefully representative) sets of nouns in
spoken English and spoken Spanish.
We see that alienable nouns occur as possessed nouns in a possessive
construction only relatively rarely (12% and 7% of the time, respectively),
Table 2. Frequencies of selected kinship terms, body part terms and alienable nouns
English kinship termsa body part termsb alienable nounsc
total 16235 100% 11038 100% 24991 100%
possessed 7797 48% 4940 45% 2967 12%
nonpossessed 8434 52% 6098 55% 22024 88%
Source: British National Corpus, spoken part
a ¼ mother, father, brother(s), sister(s), wife, husband, son(s), daughter(s), mum, dad,
grandfather, grandmother, aunt, uncle
b ¼ head, hand(s), face, finger(s), knee(s), ear(s), leg(s), wrist, hair, nose, neck, belly,
skin, elbow, chest
c ¼ car, dinner, health, tree, knife, bed, community, meat, money, bike, suitcase, tools,
book(s), room, bedroom, kitchen
Spanish kinship termsd body part termse alienable nounsf
total 18391 100% 8863 100% 10913 100%
possessed 7362 40% 1297 15% 776 7%
nonpossessed 11029 60% 7566 85% 10137 93%
Source: Corpus del Espan˜ol, spoken part
d ¼ madre, padre(s), hermano(s), hermana(s), esposa, marido, hijo(s), hija(s), mama´, papa´,
abuelo(s), abuela, tı´a, tı´o
e ¼ cabeza, mano(s), cara, dedo(s), rodilla(s), oı´do(s), pierna(s), mun˜eca, pelo, nariz,
cuello, vientre, piel, codo, pecho, hombro(s)
f ¼ coche, cena, salud, a´rbol, cuchillo, cama, comunidad, pueblo, carne, dinero, bicicleta,
maleta, herramientas, libro(s), habitacio´n, dormitorio, cocina
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while it is very common for kinship terms and body part terms to occur
as possessed nouns. (The fact that the figure for Spanish body part terms
is relatively low here is due to the omissibility of overt possessors in body-
part constructions like levanta la mano ‘raise your hand’; strictly speak-
ing, all notional possessors would have to be counted, but this is im-
possible to do automatically.)
As we saw in §4.2, what counts is relative frequencies, not absolute fre-
quencies. Since frequent alienable nouns like ‘house’ or ‘show’ are much
more frequent than rare inalienable nouns like ‘kidney’ or ‘great niece’ in
most cultural contexts, the alienable nouns may well occur in a possessive
construction more often than the inalienable nouns. However, the per-
centage of possessed occurrences of inalienable nouns will always be sig-
nificantly higher than the corresponding percentage of alienable nouns.
Thus, upon encountering an inalienable noun, it will be much easier to
predict that it occurs in a possessive construction, and the possessive
marking is therefore relatively redundant. Since languages are e‰cient
systems, they tend to show less overt coding with inalienable nouns.
Moreover, since pronominal possessors are more predictable, they show
a greater tendency to become a‰xed, thus accounting for the contrast be-
tween juxtaposition and bound expression.
Crucially, the economy account given here makes somewhat di¤erent
predictions from Haiman’s (1983) iconicity account. The facts show that
the predictions of the economy account are the correct ones.
First, the iconicity account is compatible with a hypothetical situation
in which the pronominal possessor in the inalienable construction is
actually longer than the corresponding form in the alienable possession.
However, economy additionally predicts that the form of the inalienable
pronominal possessor not only tends to be bound, but also tends to be
shorter than the alienable possessor. This is in general borne out, and I
know of no counterexamples. Some examples are given in (29).
(29) alienable
construction
inalienable
construction
a. Nakanai luma taku lima-gu
(Johnston 1981: 217) house I hand-1sg
‘my house’ ‘my hand’
b. Hua dgai fu d-za
(Haiman 1983: 793) I pig 1sg-arm
‘my pig’ ‘my arm’
c. Ndje´bbana budma´nda nga´yabba nga-ngardabba´mba
(McKay 1996: 302–6) suitcase I 1sg-liver
‘my suitcase’ ‘my liver’
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d. Kpelle Ða pri m-poˆlu
(Welmers 1973: 279) I house 1sg-back
‘my house’ ‘my back’
e. Ju|’hoan mı´ tju` m ba´
(Dickens 2005: 35) 1sg house 1sg father
‘my house’ ‘my father’
Second, Haiman’s account in terms of distance matching predicts that
the additional element in alienable constructions should occur in the
middle between the possessor and the possessum, as seen in the canonical
examples from Maltese (is-sig˙g˙u tiegh-i [the-chair of-me] ‘my chair’, see
§1) and from Abun ( ji bi nggwe [I of garden] ‘my garden’, see (18)).
However, the extra element may also occur to the left or right of both
the possessor and the possessum, as seen in (30).
(30) alienable
construction
inalienable
construction
a. Puluwat nay-iy hamwol pay-iy
(Elbert 1974: 55, 61) poss-1sg chief hand-1sg
‘my chief ’ ‘my hand’
b. 0O 0odham n˜-mi:stol-ga n˜-je 0e
(Zepeda 1983: 74–81) 1sg-cat-possd 1sg-mother
‘my cat’ ‘my mother’
c. Koyukon se-tel-eO se-tlee 0
(Thompson 1996: 654, 667) 1sg-socks-possd 1sg-head
‘my socks’ ‘my head’
d. Achagua nu-caarru-ni nu-wı´ta
(Wilson 1992) 1sg-car-possd 1sg-head
‘my car’ ‘my head’
My economy account only predicts that the coding of inalienable con-
structions should tend to be shorter, but it says nothing about the posi-
tion of the extra coding element in alienable constructions, so cases like
(30a–d) are counterevidence to Haiman’s iconicity account, but com-
patible with my economy account. Haiman (1983: 795) himself cites the
Puluwat example, recognizes that it is a problem for him, and ac-
knowledges the need to reformulate his initial generalization. But he
does not seem to recognize that the facts no longer support any role of
iconicity.
Finally, some languages show overt coding of inalienable nouns as
well, but only when they are not possessed. An example comes from
Koyukon (Athabaskan; Thompson 1996: 654, 656, 667):
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(31) Koyukon unpossessed possessed
alienable teł se-tel-e 0
socks 1sg-socks-possd
‘socks’ ‘my socks’
inalienable k 0e-tlee 0 se-tlee 0
unsp-head 1sg-head
‘head’ ‘my head’
Haiman’s iconicity does not make any predictions about unpossessed
constructions, but the economy account predicts just what we see: Alien-
able nouns tend to have overt coding in the possessed construction,
whereas inalienable nouns tend to have overt coding in the unpossessed
construction.
Thus, the iconicity account is both too weak (in that it does not predict
the shortness of inalienable possessive pronouns, seen in (29)) and too
strong (in that it wrongly predicts that the patterns in (30) should not be
possible). Economy, by contrast, makes just the right predictions.
6.2. Causative constructions
Again I claim that direct causatives are significantly more frequent than
indirect causatives and that that explains why they exhibit more cohesive
coding than indirect causatives. No appeal to iconicity is necessary.
In order to show that this is true, ideally one would examine a corpus
of a language with a regular grammatical contrast between direct and in-
direct causation, as illustrated in (19) for Buru and in (20) for Japanese. I
hope that this paper will inspire such research, and I expect that the direct
causatives are much more frequent than the indirect causatives. In the lit-
erature on English, the contrasts between the di¤erent types of periphras-
tic causatives have received some attention. According to Gilquin (2006:
7), the frequency in the British National Corpus of the four causative
verbs that combine with an infinitive are as in (32):
(32) spoken written total
make (‘I made him go’) 898 258 1,156
get (‘I got him to go’) 350 52 402
cause (‘I caused him to go’) 15 207 222
have (‘I had him go’) 48 29 77
Since the make and get causatives are usually regarded as expressing a
more direct type of causation, while the cause and have causatives express
a more indirect type of causation, this is just what we would expect.
It is also possible to compare lexical causative verbs with the corre-
sponding periphrastic cause causatives (this is also what Haiman 1983
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mostly does for the semantic aspects). Some figures from the British Na-
tional Corpus are given in (33) (these are only the forms with a pronoun
object, i.e., kill me, cause him to die, etc).
(33) stop 3267 cause to stop 6
kill 2400 cause to die 2
raise 466 cause to rise 3
bring down 269 cause to come down 0
drown 80 cause to drown 0
These comparisons are more problematic than those in (32) in that the
length of the two types of causatives di¤ers sharply, so one might suspect
that the lexical direct causatives are more frequent simply because they
are shorter. In general, such e¤ects do not seem to be particularly strong,
if they exist at all (see Haspelmath 2008: §6.5 for further discussion), but
still in the ideal case we would like to perform our corpus study on a lan-
guage where all causatives are expressed grammatically (i.e., even ‘kill’
and ‘raise’ are expressed as ‘die-caus’ and ‘rise-caus’). But since many di-
rect causatives are highly frequent (in an absolute sense) in all languages,
we normally find a lot of portmanteau expression of causatives, which
limits our options for corpus counts. Nevertheless, the figures in (32) and
(33) should be su‰cient to make a good initial case for the claim that
direct causatives are generally more frequent than indirect causatives.
If this is true, then the economy account makes a further prediction:
that markers of indirect causation should not only be less cohesive, but
also tend to be longer. And indeed a number of languages have two
causatives di¤ering primarily in length, not in cohesion (cf. Dixon 2000:
74–78).
(34) indirect causative direct causative
a. Amharic as-ba¨lla a-ba¨lla
(Haiman 1983: 786, caus-eat caus-eat
Amberber 2000: 317–320) ‘force to eat’ ‘feed’
b. Hindi ban-vaa- ban-aa-
(Dixon 2000: 67, be.built-caus be.built-caus
Saksena 1982) ‘have sth. built’ ‘build’
c. Jinghpaw -shangun sha-
(Maran and Clifton 1976)
d. Creek -ipeyc -ic
(Martin 2000: 394–399)
Although Haiman (1983: 786) cites the example from Amharic as an in-
stance of an iconicity contrast, it does not actually fit his iconicity expla-
nation. The two causatives of Amharic and the other languages in (34)
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do not di¤er in cohesion, but only in length, so the contrast is predicted
only by the economy account.10
6.3. Coordinating constructions
While Haiman’s discussion of examples like (21–22) above only mentions
the semantic contrast between greater and less conceptual distance, Wa¨l-
chli’s terminology (accidental vs. natural coordination) already points to
the real motivating factor: Natural coordination (as in 21b, 22b and 23b)
is ‘‘natural’’, i.e., frequent and expected for the pair of expressions, while
accidental coordination is infrequent and hence unexpected. Thus, it is
economical to use more explicit and less cohesive coding in accidental
coordination, and less explicit and more cohesive coding in natural
coordination.
Doing the frequency counts for clause coordination is fairly trivial. For
example, in the German version of The wolf and the seven little kids (one
of Grimm’s fairy tales), there are 47 und-coordinations, and 41 of them
show subject identity, while only 6 have di¤erent subjects. All 47 cases
exhibit temporal closeness.
For noun phrase conjunction of the type da-dzma ‘brother-and-sister’
(23b), the frequency counts are less straightforward, because the defini-
tion of accidental and natural coordination is quite vague: Wa¨lchli (2005:
5) describes natural coordination as ‘‘coordination of items which are ex-
pected to cooccur, which are closely related in meaning, and which form
conceptual units’’. This is not specific enough to test the claim directly,
but it seems plausible that for noun phrases, too, it will be possible to
show that coordinations of the type ‘brother and sister’ will turn out to
be more frequent than coordinations of the type ‘the man and the snake’.
6.4. Complement-clause constructions
For many of the examples given by Haiman and Givo´n, the frequency ex-
planation is completely straightforward. With ‘want’ verbs (cf. 24a–b),
the same-subject use is of course overwhelmingly more frequent than the
di¤erent-subject use, for well-understood reasons (our desires naturally
concern first of all our own actions), and this is often reflected in shorter
coding (cf. Haspelmath 1999). This explains the contrast between English
wanna and want to, and also a similar contrast between gotta and got to (I
gotta go home now vs. I got to go to Hawaii last winter) that was already
pointed out and correctly explained by Bolinger (1961: 27) (‘‘condensa-
tion is tied to familiarity’’, cited approvingly by Haiman 1985: 126).
There are also obvious frequency asymmetries between the pairs make/
cause (cf. 25), want/wish (cf. 26), and tell/insist (cf. 27) which su‰ce to
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explain the shorter coding of the first member of each pair.11 Givo´n is
right that in each case there is also a semantic contrast, but in order
to show that the semantic contrast is indeed responsible for the formal
contrast, he should provide contrasting examples of constructions with
roughly equal frequency.
In contrasts such as (28a–b) (She saw him coming out of the theatre vs.
She saw that he came out of the theatre), which do not exhibit a striking
frequency asymmetry, another factor is clearly highly relevant: In (28a),
the complement event necessarily occurs simultaneously with the main
event, in contrast to (28b), where the complement event could take place
at some other time (She saw that he would come out only two hours later/
that he had come out two hours earlier). In Cristofaro’s (2003: §5.3.2)
terms, (28a) shows ‘‘predetermination’’ of the tense value of the comple-
ment clause, and Cristofaro rightly explains the lack of finiteness (i.e., the
lack of tense) in (28a) as due to ‘‘syntagmatic economy’’: Information
that can be readily inferred from the context can be left out. (See also
Horie 1993: 203–212 for related discussion.)
This factor of predetermination is of course not unrelated to the
broader notion of semantic closeness. If a complement-taking verb prede-
termines the tense value and other semantic properties of its complement,
this can be seen as one facet of ‘‘conceptual closeness’’ or ‘‘event integra-
tion’’. However, such cases do not provide evidence for iconicity of cohe-
sion, because the higher syntagmatic cohesion of She saw him coming out
of the theatre would be expected anyway for reasons of economy.12
7. Conclusion
I conclude that for most of the core phenomena for which iconicity of
quantity, complexity and cohesion have been claimed to be responsible,
there are very good reasons to think that they are in fact explained by fre-
quency asymmetries and the economy principle. The final result may look
iconic to the linguist in some cases, but iconicity is not the decisive causal
factor.
Linguists have rarely discussed the mechanism by which iconicity could
come to have a causal role in shaping grammars. However, Givo´n claims
that iconic structures are easier to process than noniconic structures:
The iconicity meta-principle: All other things being equal, a coded experience is
easier to store, retrieve, and communicate if the code is maximally isomorphic to
the experience. (Givo´n 1985: 189)
And similarly, Dressler et al. (1987: 18) say that the more iconic a sign is,
the more ‘‘natural’’ it is, i.e., the easier speakers find using it.
Frequency vs. iconicity in explaining grammatical assymetries 25
If these claims were correct also for iconicity of quantity, complexity
and cohesion, it would indeed be predicted that such iconic structures
should be preferred by speakers, and we should see a significant e¤ect of
iconicity in language structures. But in fact we do not see such an e¤ect.
We see e¤ects of frequency and predictability, i.e. of the economy princi-
ple, which (as everyone agrees) is independently needed. What we can
conclude from this is that the above claims are wrong, i.e., that iconic
structures are apparently not necessarily preferred in processing.
The respective role of iconicity and economy was discussed already
in the 1980s. Haiman (1983: 802) recognized that formal complexity/
simplicity is very often economically motivated, and he rejected the sub-
sumption of economic motivation under iconicity, even though one might
argue that the correspondence between a linguistic dimension (full vs. re-
duced form) and a conceptual dimension (unpredictable vs. predictable) is
itself iconic. As an example of economic motivation, he cites the tendency
for predictable referents to be coded with little material (short pronouns
or zero), while less predictable or unpredictable referents are coded with
more material (longer pronouns or full NPs) (as documented in Givo´n
(ed.) 1983).
However, Givo´n (1985: 197) sees the correlation between unpredict-
ability and amount of coding material as primarily iconic (see also Givo´n
1991: 87–89), and he objects to Haiman’s economy account:
. . . the principle of economy has not been working here by itself, since the end re-
sult of such a situation would have been the exclusive use of zero anaphora for all
topic identification in discourse. (Givo´n 1991: 87–89)
But that economy (favoring the speaker’s needs) is not the only relevant
factor in communication should be clear from the beginning—if there
were no opposite principle of distinctiveness (favoring the hearer), we
would have no linguistic forms at all. Another argument that Givo´n
makes is the following:
It may well be that Zipf-like economy considerations were indeed involved in the
diachronic . . . shaping of the quantity-scale . . . But the end result is nonetheless
an iconic—isomorphic—relation between code and coded. And such a relation
surely carries its own meta-motivation, i.e., [the iconicity meta-principle, cited at
the beginning of this section]. (Givo´n 1991: 87–89)
This last sentence simply does not follow. If the end result is iconic in the
eyes of the analyst, this does not mean that it is iconically motivated, i.e.,
that iconicity is a relevant causal factor. The empirical evidence from
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frequency distributions and cross-linguistic coding types that was cited in
this paper shows that iconicity may well be irrelevant for an explanation
of the grammatical asymmetries considered here. That is, in the debate
between Haiman and Givo´n, Haiman was right to favor economy over
iconicity in explaining the quantity scale for referent expressions. How-
ever, as I hope to have shown here, Haiman’s economy explanation
should be extended also to many other cases that he and others explained
in terms of iconicity.
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1. In C. S. Peirce’s received typology of signs, there are three types of icons: diagrams,
images, and metaphors (see, e.g., Dressler 1995 for discussion). Nowadays metaphor
is not generally discussed under the heading of iconicity, and imagic iconicity is rele-
vant primarily for onomatopoeia. This paper is exclusively concerned with possible
iconicity e¤ects in grammar, so only diagrammatic iconicity will be considered here.
The relevance of Peirce’s semiotic concepts to the study of grammar was first brought
to linguists’ attention by Jakobson (1965).
2. The idea that (syntagmatic and paradigmatic) isomorphism can be considered an in-
stance of Peircean iconicity was apparently first proposed by Anttila (1989, originally
published in 1972). A number of authors have noted that this represents a fairly
extreme extension of Peirce’s original concept, and Itkonen (2004) flatly rejects the
subsumption of isomorphism under iconicity.
3. Haiman (1985: 194–195) recognizes that ‘‘the motivation for the reduction is also
partly economic: one gives less expression to that which is familiar or predict-
able’’, but he does not consider the possibility that the motivation may be entirely
economic.
4. Lako¤ and Johnson (1980: 127) apply their principle ‘‘more of form is more of con-
tent’’ (which they call a metaphor, not relating it to iconicity) to cases of iteration (She
ran and ran and ran and ran) and lengthening (He is bi-i-i-i-ig!). Such extragrammatical
phenomena may well be motivated by a kind of iconicity of quantity. However, their
attempt to extend the principle to grammatical reduplication fails: While many cases of
reduplication signal ‘‘more of content’’ (e.g., plurality, continuative aspect), this is by
no means always the case (Moravcsik 1978 also mentions a widespread sense of dimi-
nution and attenuation, and more specific senses such as indi¤erence and pretending).
Grammatical reduplication is apparently just like a‰xation in that the reduplicated
form is always the rarer one.
5. The third vs. first/second person contrast has also been interpreted as a kind of ‘‘icon-
icity of absence’’ (closely related to iconicity of quantity as seen in §2): Haiman (1985:
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4–5), citing Benveniste (1946), claims that the third person, as a non-speech act partic-
ipant, can be seen as an ‘‘absent’’ person, a ‘‘non-person’’ that is iconically represented
by a non-desinence (i.e., zero). But neither Benveniste nor Haiman mention impera-
tives, where the hearer is present, but a second-person desinence is typically absent
(see (10) below). (See also the discussion in Helmbrecht 2004: 228–229.)
6. Lehmann (1974: 113) notes that length correlates with rarity, but instead of following
Zipf in explaining length with reference to frequency/rarity, he suggests that rarity can
also be seen as equivalent to improbability or informational value. He then assumes
that informational value correlates with semantic complexity and infers that rare items
tend to be semantically complex. But evidently informational value in the statistical
sense is very di¤erent from semantic complexity. Talking about animals or perceiving
is perhaps in some technical sense of high informational value (even though it is not
very informative), but it is hard to argue that animal and perceive are semantically
more complex than cat or see.
7. A reviewer observes that the English pair widow/widower in (10) is also an isolated
exception and asks how it is di¤erent from beautiful/beauty. The answer is that the
widow/widower contrast is not isolated from a cross-linguistic point of view: There is
a general tendency for this pair to show overt coding on the male member (e.g., Ger-
man Witwe/Witw-er, Russian vdova/vdov-ec), whereas beautiful/beauty is isolated not
only within English, but also cross-linguistically.
8. Also much of the earlier functionalist literature is insu‰ciently explicit with regard to
the causal factor. For example, Comrie (1989: 128) only invokes the ‘‘naturalness’’ of
certain associations between role and animacy, a relatively vague notion compared to
frequency.
9. Cf. also Lako¤ and Johnson’s (1980: 128–132) principle ‘‘closeness is strength of
effect’’, which is, however, not related to iconicity by them, but is regarded as a
metaphor. The frequency-based perspective here suggests that Lako¤ and Johnson’s
metaphor-based account is not necessary.
10. A further observation is that direct vs. indirect causation is not the only semantic
parameter by which competing causatives di¤er. Dixon (2000: 76) lists the following
parameters and observes that they all tend to correlate with the degree of ‘‘compact-
ness’’ of the causative marker (i.e., its shortness).
longer marker shorter marker
action state
transitive intransitive
causee having control causee lacking control
causee unwilling causee willing
causee fully a¤ected causee partially a¤ected
accidental intentional
with e¤ort naturally
Not all of these can be subsumed under ‘‘less conceptual distance’’, but they can be
plausibly related to frequency asymmetries. This is a matter for future research.
11. Leech et al. 2001 give the following figures for the verbal lexemes, which can be taken
as representative for the complement-clause constructions as well: want 945, wish 30;
tell 775, insist 67; make 2165, cause 206.
12. Cristofaro (2003: Ch. 9), while pointing to the importance of the factor of predetermi-
nation, still wants to retain semantic integration and iconicity as explanatory factors
for complement-clause constructions. But like Haiman and Givo´n, she does not even
consider the potential explanatory value of frequency-based economy.
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